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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A CHILD'S EMOTIONAL HEALTH-THE NEED
FOR LEGAL PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
"A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies."' With those words, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the future welfare of the nation depends upon
the health and vigor of today's children. Through the legal process,
children are beginning to break the bond of what Martin Luther King,
Jr., called "nobodyness"2 and are gradually gaining protection of their
natural rights.' Child abuse a statutes in all states have established min-
imal standards of care, which, if not met, justify intervention on behalf
of the child. Yet the majority of statutory schemes designed to protect
the "best interests of the child" are deficient in one critical aspect.
5
Though great strides have been taken to ensure the child's physical
well-being, little has been done to safeguard mental and emotional
well-being. The law cannot adequately provide for the welfare of chil-
dren without recognizing that mental and physical development are in-
separably intertwined. To promote one without concern for the other is
futile. This comment will expose the need for the law to concern itself
with the mental health of children, and will suggest methods by which
this may be accomplished.
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1943).
2. Greene, An Overview of Children's Rights: A Moral and Ethical Perspective, in CHIL-
DREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 9 (1979).
3. For a good discussion of the natural rights of children see Coughlin, United Nations Dec-
laration ofthe Rights of the Child, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN-EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW
AND SOCIETY 7-23 (A. Wilkerson ed. 1973).
4. The term "child abuse" in this comment refers both to intentional child abuse on the part
of the parent, and to neglect of the child through a parent's omission or failure to act.
5. For a digest of child neglect laws in all American jurisdictions see Katz, Howe, & Mc-
Grath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 73-362 (1975). For a compilation of these
statutes see Jenkins, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 720-21
n.48 (1978).
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF CHILD ABUSE
Throughout history children have been subjected to mutilation, se-
vere beatings, slavery, and infanticide. The ancient Roman doctrine of
patriapotestas6 endowed the father with absolute power over his off-
spring. Children were viewed as chattel and were accorded no separate
identity from their fathers. They could be bought, sold, or intentionally
deformed. The more grotesque their disfigurement, the more profitable
they became as beggars.7
Beatings and other forms of severe punishment were believed nec-
essary to drive out evil spirits and to maintain proper conduct. Because
children were considered the property of their parents, parents were
free to treat their offspring in any way the parents desired. Schoolmas-
ters often flogged students upon the slightest infraction of the rules.8
Occasionally voices of protest were raised. Plato, as well as Plutarch,
abhorred the use of the whip. Centuries later, Sir Thomas More and
John Colet argued that learning could be better facilitated through gen-
tleness than through fear. These reformers, however, failed to convince
the majority of society's members of the need for change.9 Countless
children were sacrificed to appease the gods. In India and in Mexico,
infants were tossed into rivers to satisfy the gods of water. Likewise,
children were sacrificed to assure a good harvest. Some infants were
slain and their flesh fed to mothers in the belief that this would produce
healthy offspring. It was believed that the child's blood would bring
strength and youthfulness. °
The Middle Ages witnessed the conception of the doctrine of
parenspatriae'l which recognized that parental rights brought corre-
6. Patria potestas
denotes the aggregate of those peculiar powers and rights which, by the civil law of
Rome, belonged to the head of a family in respect to his wife, children, (natural or
adopted,) and any more remote descendants who sprang from him through males only.
Anciently, it was of very extensive reach, embracing even the power of life and death,
but was gradually curtailed, until finally it amounted to little more than a right. . . to
hold as his own any property or acquisitions of one under his power.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (5th ed. 1979).
7. For a historical overview of child abuse see Radbill, A Historyof ChildAbuseandInfanti-
eide, in THE BATrERED CHILD 3 (1968); Thomas, ChildAbuse and Neglect: Part Iisl/orical Over.
view, Legal Matrix and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293-449 (1972).
8. Radbill, supra note 7, at 3.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 8.
11. The doctrine ofparenspatriae evolved from the king's authority to protect those unable
to protect themselves. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (5th ed. 1979). In modem times it autho-
rizes the state to intervene to protect the best interests of the child even though such action is
contrary to the wishes of the parent. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943); Miller v. Hed-
rick, 158 Cal. App. 2d 281, 322 P.2d 231 (1958). Cf. Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231
[Vol. 15:299
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sponding parental duties. If corresponding duties were not met, the
state terminated parental authority and assumed responsibility for the
welfare of the child. 2 Although children were gradually gaining pro-
tection, they were still primarily considered economic assets. 
3
"Attitudes toward the rights of children under law and under the
parental thumb have gradually changed throughout the centuries, but
the change is more a matter of degree than essence."' 4 The old Roman
and medieval laws are no longer granted official sanction. But tradi-
tion dies slowly and acceptance of the old concepts is evident within
our culture. The common law clearly bears the imprint of an order
conceived during the age of feudalism.'"
III. MODERN TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION
The law has long recognized that parents, rather than the state, are
better suited for rearing children.' 6 Governmental policy, therefore,
has been to secure parental rights, often at the expense of children.'
7
Although reform legislation has successfully protected children outside
the home,'" the state has hesitated to defend their interests as members
of the family. When intervention has been deemed necessary, justifica-
tion has been based upon the doctrine ofparenspatriae.19 In practice,
U.S. 320 (1913) (upholding state prohibition of employment of children in dangerous occupa-
tions); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1907) (upholding state regulation of women's work hours
as furthering public interest in healthy offspring).
12. V. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 228 (1973).
13. S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 4 (1971).
14. FONTANA, supra note 12, at 227.
15. H. FOSTER, JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN 4 (1974).
16. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943). "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 166. See Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
17. Thomas, ChildAbuse and Neglect: Part I Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and Social
Perspectives 166, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293 (1972).
18. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) (child labor regulations designed
to protect children deemed binding over parental authority); Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v.
Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913) (upholding state prohibition of employment of children in dan-
gerous occupations).
19. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943). "It cannot be doubted that the State
was entitled to prohibit the employment of persons of tender years in dangerous occupations
.... The imposition of absolute requirements of this sort is a familiar exercise of the protective
power of government." Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beachamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913). State v.
Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901).
The natural rights of a parent to the custody and control of his infant child are
subordinate to the power of the state. . . .The welfare of the child and the best interests
of society require that the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the child
the opportunity to acquire an education.
Id. at 731-32.
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however, the parent holds a virtually free hand in the care and treat-
ment of his child. His authority to do with his children as he sees fit is
seldom questioned because failure to perform his duties is rarely ob-
served so long as the child appears reasonably well-fed and clothed.20
The failure to safeguard the interests of children through law was
observed by Dean Pound near the turn of the century.21 He accredited
this lack of protection to two fundamental causes. First, the rights of
parents have been firmly established at law, and any attempt to secure
the interests of children is likely to chisel away traditional parental au-
thority.22 Second, the family has been the cornerstone upon which our
society has been built.23 The majority of parents are successful in rear-
ing their offspring without impinging seriously upon the child's rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized and staunchly defended the
right of an individual to initiate and preserve a coherent, private family
unit with strictly limited governmental interference.24 In 1923 the
Court ruled that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
guaranteed an individual's right "to marry, establish a home and bring
up children. ... 25 In addition, the Court has ruled that "[tlhe child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations. 26 There exists a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
'27
It is clear that society greatly values the family as an institution,
but equally clear that society has an interest in maintaining the rights
of all individuals, particularly those who cannot protect themselves.
Those involved in the lawmaking process have gradually begun to
place greater emphasis upon the protection of children. Parental
claims to custody and authority have been limited to protect those in-
terests, but the state has not gone far enough. Although the role of
government in child protection "has been clearly one of slow expan-
sion,"'28 it must continue to expand until a child's right to emotional
20. FONTANA, supra note 12, at 228.




24. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
25. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
26. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1924).
27. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
28. KATz, supra note 13, at 4.
[Vol. 15:299
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health is established and protected.
IV. NEGLECT STATUTES
The law traditionally has defined neglect solely in physical
terms.z9 Society generally has required parents to meet the physical
needs of their children. Through neglect statutes, the law seeks to guar-
antee that all children will be provided the physical necessities of life,
and to ensure that they are not subjected to physical abuse or mistreat-
ment. All states have passed some manner of neglect legislation.30 It
has been recognized that the state has the responsibility to intervene on
behalf of the child when parents fail to meet minimal standards.3
Although neglect statutes in every state provide for the physical
care of children,32 the great majority of such statutes make no provision
for the emotional care of children.33 "Gross physical abuse is only one
segment of a much wider problem of parental neglect. The unloved
child, the emotionally traumatized child, the socially and emotionally
deprived child, become a part of our neurotic, disturbed, retarded, or
delinquent adults."34 Specialists in the field of mental health have long
warned that any statutory definition of neglect must address a child's
emotional needs.35 These warnings have seldom been heeded 36 despite
knowledge that psychological abuse may be detrimental to mental
growth and development.37
Typical neglect provisions deal with what has been termed a
29. Eg., OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740 (1977). See Gesmonde, Emotional Neglect In Connecti-
cut, 5 CONN. L. REV. 100, 104 (1972); Jenkens, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 669, 715-16 (1978); Satz, Howe, & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 4 (1975). For a statute broadening the definition see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-546.A.2 (1974)
which states in part: "Abuse means the infliction of physical or mental injury or the causing of
deterioration of a child and shall include failing to maintain reasonable care and treatment or
exploiting or overworking a child to such an extent that his health, morals or emotional well-being
is endangered." Id.
30. For a compliation of these statutes see Jenkens, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 720-21 n.48 (1978). For a digest of these laws see Katz, Howe, &
McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 73-362 (1975).
31. Jenkens, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 720-21 (1978).
32. Paulsen, The Law and.4bused Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 176 (1968).
33. KATz, supra note 13, at 61.
34. Bain, The Physically Abused Child, 31 PEDIATRICS 895, 897 (1963), quoted in Note, The
Legal Response to Child,4buse, II WM. & MARY L. REV. 960, 960 (1970). See also J. BOWLBY,
CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 90 (2d ed. 1965).
35. Gesmonde, Emotional Neglect In Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. REV. 100, 104 (1972).
36. This is best demonstrated by the failure of most neglect statutes to address the issue of
mental and emotional care. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
37. See notes 53-57 infra and accompanying text.
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"first" or "apparent" level.38 They are concerned with those acts, or
failures to act, which are open and obvious, and which appear to have a
clear causal link between harm or possible harm to the child. They
make no provision for the emotional upset which may be induced by
various acts or failures to act.39 Minnesota is one of the few states
which addresses the issue of emotional health in its neglect statute. A
neglected child is therein defined as one "[w]ho is without necessary
subsistence, education or other care necessary for his physical or
mental health or morals because his parent, guardian or other custo-
dian neglects or refuses to provide it. ... -0 New York also considers
the problem of emotional deprivation by defining a neglected child as
one "whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired
.. . as a result of the failure of his parent or other person legally re-
sponsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care. . ... ,4 In
providing for a child's emotional well-being, these statutes recognize
that physical and mental development are interrelated. By addressing
a child's psychological requirements, they command that the child's to-
tal needs be considered.
A number of reasons exist for the general reluctance of most legis-
latures to expand neglect statutes to include emotional neglect. First,
there is a strong presumption that children receive love and emotional
support from their parents.42 This presumption is the foundation of
wrongful death statutes which allow a child to recover monetary dam-
ages for the loss of parental guidance and comfort.4 3 Indeed, society
38. KATz, supra note 13, at 61. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
39. KATZ, supra note 13, at 61.
40. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (10)(c) (West 1971).
41. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT 29A § 1012 (f) (i) (McKinney 1975). Accord, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-
546.A.2 (1974) (which also defines abuse to include the infliction of mental injury).
42. Eg., In re Palmer, 81 Wash. 2d 604, 503 P.2d 464 (1972) (en banc). "The nature of
parenthood is such that in most instances the parents of the child will be most likely to best
provide for its welfare. The maintenance of natural family relations is favored, and parental
affection is an element of priceless advantage to the child." Id. at 607, 503 P.2d at 466. Accord, In
re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). In Johnson v. Southern Pacific R.R., 154 Cal.
285, 97 P. 520 (1908), the presumption that children receive emotional support from their parents
was shown by the court's allowing the children to recover for the value of their mother's "nurture
and instruction, moral and physical, and intellectual training." Id. at ._, 97 P. at 526. In order to
allow recovery for the loss of these benefits, the court must have presumed they initially existed.
"The legal presumption is that it is for the best interests of the child and of society for the child to
remain with its natural parents during the period of its minority and be maintained, cared for, and
educated by them and under their supervision and direction." Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah 382,
134 P. 898, 901 (1913). See generally Foster & Freed, A Bill ofRighis for Children, in THE
YOUNGEST MINORITY, LAWYERS IN DEFENSE OF CHILDREN 323 (1974).
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places the responsibility on parents to comfort their children and assist
them in learning to interact with other people. But the real and the
ideal are often worlds apart. Because child abuse is now known to be
widespread,' the presumption that children are always loved should be
reassessed. A second reason that neglect statutes have not been broad-
ened to include emotional neglect is that emotional deprivation is not
easily observed by the untrained eye. No visible spectacle exists with
which to shock the public conscience, thereby inducing legislative ac-
tion. Society as a whole is reluctant to consider a child abused or ne-
glected when he appears reasonably well groomed and nourished.45 A
third reason lies in the widespread failure of laymen to comprehend the
impact that psychological factors play in human development.46
Outside medical circles, the dangers of emotional deprivation are not
commonly known. Consequently, neglect is generally defined solely in
physical terms. It is associated with "bad housing, poverty and over-
crowding,"47 but seldom with emotional conflict and the effects such
conflict may have on development.
Legislating for children is more difficult than legislating to protect
the rights of adults, because in protecting the rights of children,
lawmakers invariably cross into territory previously reserved to par-
ents.48 Any shift toward increased child protection is certain to be mis-
interpreted by some voters as an attack on the traditional family unit.
The pressure to maintain status quo may impede much-needed reform.
To define neglect in physical terms is relatively simple. Criteria
are readily available by which to judge when disease or lack of food or
shelter place a child's health or existence in imminent danger.4 9 Any
statutory definition of psychological neglect, however, will be less clear-
cut than a definition of physical neglect. Further, the complexities of
new findings by mental health experts are not easily understood. These
reasons partially explain why neglect has traditionally been defined
solely in physical terms.
The primary purpose for every neglect statute is to protect chil-
dren. In light of this objective, it is in the best interests of children that
44. FONTANA, supra note 12, at xi. "[C]hild maltreatment is a major national problem that
demands massive action now." Id. The extent of the problem is shown by the existence of report-
ing laws in all fifty states. See generally Note, The Legal Response to Child Abuse, 11 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 960 (1970).
45. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
46. J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 91 (2d ed. 1965).
47. Id.
48. FONTANA, supra note 12, at 232. See notes 18-27 supra and accompanying text.
49. Satz, Howe, & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4 (1975).
1979]
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legislative action be taken to establish "emotional neglect" as a sepa-
rate legal standard. Such a move would not radically depart from the
past governmental policy to safeguard the rights of children and to act
when necessary on their behalf.5" Rather, it would be a logical exten-
sion into an area which has always deserved protection, but heretofore
not been fully understood. The need for such a standard is further jus-
tified because of the "judicial reluctance to carve out categories of ne-
glect that are not clearly provided for in the statute itself. Specific
statutory reference to mental health would provide the needed 'peg'
upon which to hang a finding of emotional deprivation."'" Children
deserve the opportunity to develop into healthy adults. If they are be-
ing denied this opportunity, intervention is clearly required.
V. EMOTIONAL DEPRIVATION-THE MEDICAL FINDINGS
It has long been public policy for the state to intervene, when nec-
essary, to protect the welfare of children.52 Disturbingly, the law too
frequently fails to meet this responsibility. Medical science reveals a
close relationship between mental and physical well-being. The failure
to respond to the psychological needs of children is evidenced by the
failure to safeguard them from intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress by their parents.
Childhood experiences play a major role in the evolution of. the
individual personality.53 Whether a child receives the warmth, affec-
tion, and companionship he needs will greatly influence his ability to
interact socially and to mature intellectually.54 Increasing evidence
reveals that an intimate relationship between young children and their
mother, or permanent mother-substitute, is essential for healthy emo-
tional development.5 - This intimate relationship between the mother
and child, altered in numerous ways by interactions with the father, is
believed to be the foundation upon which emotional stability is built.
5 6
50. KATZ, supra note 13, at 4.
51. Id. at 68.
52. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
53. M. RIBBLE, THE RIGHTS OF INFANTS 3 (1943). See notes 61-64 infra and accompanying
text.
54. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 18
(1973).
55. J. BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH 11 (Schocken ed. 1966).
56. BOWLBY, supra note 46, at 13. The failure to achieve such a relationship is known as
"maternal deprivation." Id. at 14. The term is used broadly to describe various situations. A
child living in a family which remains together is deprived if his parents are unwilling or unable to
give him the love and care he needs. If the bonds of affection are never established, the child may
be emotionally crippled. Id.; Ainsworth, The Effects af Maternal Deprivation: A Reviei of Find-
[Vol. 15:299
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A child who does not receive adequate parental care and attention
may suffer social, physical, or mental retardation. 7 The intellect is
particularly susceptible to injury. Impairments in language, the ability
to comprehend abstraction, and the capacity to cultivate and maintain
close personal ties frequently are seriously affected.58 A child's growth
rate may be slowed even though he receives excellent physical care. 9
This was revealed when researchers surveyed institutionalized infants
who were completely deprived of parental care. Although material
provisions were adequate, they suffered from a lack of physical growth
as well as from psychological damage. The incidence of disease among
such children was higher than among children raised in more normal
environments. Insomnia was widespread and mental retardation com-
mon. At later stages, these children experienced difficulty in forming
mature relationships with others. These children eventually faced diffi-
culty in forming meaningful relationships with their own children.6"
Emotionally deprived children are also hindered in the develop-
ment of their consciences and personalities. In the most severe cases,
[t]here is an inability to love or feel guilty. There is no con-
science. Their inability to enter into any relationship makes
treatment or even education impossible. They have no idea of
time, so that they cannot recall past experience and cannot
benefit from past experience or be motivated to future goals.
This lack of time concept is a striking feature in the defective
ings and Controversy in the Context of Research Strategy, in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE, A
REASSESSMENT OF ITS EFFECTS 98-102 (1966). See Prugh & Harlow, "Masked Deprivation" in
Infants and Young Children, in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE, A REASSESSMENT OF ITS
EFFECTS 14-16 (1966). Likewise, a child physically removed from his mother may be emotionally
devastated. BOWLBY, supra note 46, at 14.
The degree of harm caused by deprivation will depend upon the degree of separation.
Partial deprivation brings. . .anxiety, excessive need for love, powerful feelings of re-
venge, and, arising from these last, guilt and depression. A young child, still immature
in mind and body, cannot cope with all these emotions and drives. The ways in which he
responds to these disturbances of his inner life may in the end bring about nervous disor-
ders and instability of character.
Id. Complete deprivation of parental love may result in death. RIBBLE, supra note 53, at 4-6. In
the early part of this century it was discovered that newborn infants kept in the best hospitals often
drifted slowly into death, "while infants in the poorest homes, with a good mother, often overcame
the handicaps of poverty and unhygienic surroundings .... [T]he element lacking in the steril-
ized lives of the babies of the former class ... was mother love." Id.
57. E.g., BOWLBY, supra note 46, at 21.
58. Ainsworth, The Effects of Maternal Deprivation: .4 Review of Findings and Controversy in
the Context o/Research Strategy, in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE, A REASSESSMENT OF ITS
EFFECTS 107 (1966).
59. See R. PATTON & L. GARDNER, GROWTH FAILURE IN MATERNAL DEPRIVATION 52-80
(1963). Patton and Gardner give several case histories of growth failure and slowed mental devel-
opment due to maternal deprivation.
60. BOWLBY, supra note 55, at 27.
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organization of the personality structure ....
In contrast, children who receive sufficient emotional nurturing gener-
ally develop normally even though they are raised in lower socio-eco-
nomic surroundings. Social workers frequently encounter children
who are obviously well-loved and who are mentally stable though they
suffer from neglect in the sense that they are inadequately fed or
clothed.
6 2
Each stage of childhood leaves its mark on the maturing personal-
ity. A child must develop a feeling of his own self-worth before he will
be able to gain confidence in himself and others. When an infant is
raised in an atmosphere which does not promote his self-respect, the
result is an adult with little or no concern for his personal appearance
or the impression he makes on others. 63 His ability to work and coop-
erate with others is diminished. The damaging effects on both mental
and physical development are sometimes irreversible.
64
The emotional bond between parent and child is important, not
only to the individual child, but to the welfare of society as a whole.
"[T]here is a specific connection between prolonged deprivation in the
early years and the, development of an affection-less psychopathic char-
acter given to persistent delinquent conduct which is extremely difficult
to treat." 65 A propensity to steal is characteristic. 66 Because parents
generally raise their children in the same manner in which they them-
selves were raised,67 mental ill-health brought on by affection-less
methods of child rearing can become a self-perpetuating cycle. This
61. BOWLBY, supra note 46, at 40.
62. RIBBLE, supra note 53, at 4; BOWLBY, supra note 46, at 90.
63. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 54, at 20.
64. BOWLBY, supra note 46, at 21. See generally FORUM 22, WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON
CHILDREN, The Rights of Children: Report of Forum 22, 353 (1970): PATrON & GARDNER, supra
note 65, at 83-84, found that children who were subjected to early deprivation remained smaller in
height and weight than the majority of their peers. See also 0. WOODWARD, THE EARLIEST
YEARS 22 (1966). In discussing these problems one author has written:
When childhood experiences are overwhelmingly stressful, arrest of personality occurs
and a pattern of repetitive maladaptive behavior may be set in train, which like an ill
fate prevents the individual from ever achieving his full potentialities in adult life. A
child for example who was deserted by her mother in childhood may be unable to master
this event satisfactorily at the time. It often happens that such a person continues even in
adult life to seek for a loving mother and in so doing makes inordinate and inappropriate
demands on other people such as her husband, or even her employer. When these other
people realize they cannot meet the demands made upon them, they turn away, once
more abandoning the crippled individual just as her mother had abandoned her in the
past.
S. WOLFF, CHILDREN UNDER STRESS 13 (1969).
65. BOWLBY, supra note 55, at 34.
66. Id. at 33.
67. FONTANA, supra note 12, at 110.
[Vol. 15:299
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cycle of emotional instability and criminal propensity can continue in-
definitely. For successful development, it is imperative that a child re-
ceive ample love and companionship. The change in medical focus in
childcare away from physical necessities alone should signal lawmakers
that good health requires more than food, clothing, and shelter.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
If the protective hand of the law is to shield children from emo-
tional abuse and neglect, the responsibility must fall upon the courts as
well as the legislature. The courts, however, have generally been as
unwilling as the legislatures to challenge traditional parental authority.
Intervention into family affairs has been held to a minimal level.
While such restraint is desirable, the courts have been too restrictive;
intervention has been limited solely to instances of physical mistreat-
ment.68 Neglect statutes have been construed narrowly69 as the judici-
ary has been reluctant to expand the definition of neglect.
In view of public policy, it is ironic that the courts should interpret
neglect statutes so narrowly. First, the idea of the "best interests of the
child" has traditionally been the measure to determine when govern-
mental intervention is justified.7" Indeed, this standard is to outweigh
all other considerations when the court must make a determination as
to custody.7 ' Emotional nurturing on the part of the parent clearly
68. Eg., Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
69. FOSTER, supra note 15, at 13-14. E.g., Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105
(1978). In that case, the court refused to recognize a child's cause of action against his parents for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In part, the court justified its refusal on the legisla-
ture's adoption of an "extensive and all-inclusive" scheme designed to insure the well-being of
children. The statute did not provide for parental liability for intentional mental abuse. The court
said that as the "establishment of a civil cause of action might interfere with the total legislative
scheme," id. at _, 588 P.2d I 10, the court should not recognize such an action. Even though the
purpose of all neglect statutes is to protect children from harm, the omission from the statute of
any language pertaining to emotional care prompted the court to deny an action for emotional
distress.
70. "ITihe welfare of the child is the controlling fact in determining the right to its custody
. Stanton v. Stanton, 13 Ga. 545, _, 100 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1957). In determining the cus-
tody of the child "the primary and controlling issue is the welfare of the child ... " McMillin v.
McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, _ 158 P.2d 444, 446 (1945). See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2,
§§ 15.01-.02 (2) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
A parent may file a petition requesting termination of the parent-child relationship with
his child. The petition may be granted if the court finds that termination is in the best
interest of the child. . . .A petition requesting termination of the parent-child relation-
ship with respect to a parent who is not the petitioner may be granted if the court finds
* ' * termination is in the best interests of the child.
Id. Accord Barry v. Sparks, 306 Mass. 80, 27 N.E.2d 728 (1940); Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285
P. 606 (1930).
71. Whenever a divorce decree "has reference to the custody of children their welfare is of
11
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plays a major role in determining the health and stability of the child.
Because of the unwillingness of the legislative and judicial branches to
recognize such a need, however, a child's natural right to love and care
does not receive legal sanction. Even though the standard is usually
the best interests of the child, his best interests are frequently not con-
sidered. This is grossly unjust to those least able to defend themselves.
To urge judicial intervention in cases of emotional abuse is not to
urge interference with a parent's right to discipline.72 A child need not
be shielded from every situation apt to trigger distress. Coping with
situations that do not always go his way prepares him to face the com-
mon adversities of adulthood. A growing child needs guidance, needs
instruction, and at times must be corrected for the sake of his own
proper training. Parents should not have to fear possible court pro-
ceedings when their children are disturbed as the result of necessary
and beneficial discipline, but parental authority should be properly ex-
ercised. The law should not allow a child's physical or mental health to
be jeopardized under the guise of reprimand. The privilege to punish is
limited to correction and moderation.73 "[A] parent may not destroy
the child whom he has a right to correct."74 Parents do not own chil-
controlling importance and in determining such welfare a number of factors may be considered."
Thurman v. Thurman, 73 Idaho 122, 245 P.2d 810, 814 (1952). The court in a custody proceeding
does not adjudicate a controversy between the contending parties to compose their private differ-
ences, but "acts asparenspatriae to do what is best for the interest of the child." Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N.Y. 429, -, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). "It is well settled in this state that the welfare of the
child is of paramount importance in determining who is entitled to its custody, and that the wel-
fare of the child is to be regarded more than the technical rights of the parent." Pierce v. Jeffries,
103 W. Va. 410, _ 137 S.E. 651, 652 (1927).
72. It is universally accepted that parents may punish a child in order to maintain discipline.
E.g, Hansen v. Hansen, 48 U.S.L.W. 2472 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. 288,
479 P.2d 648 (1971). In Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), an action by a
minor son against his father for negligence, the court stated:
Since the law imposes on the parent a duty to rear and discipline his child and confers
the right to prescribe a course of reasonable conduct for its development, the parent has
a wide discretion in the performance of his parental functions, but that discretion does
not include the right wilfully to inflict personal injuries beyond the limits of reasonable
parental discipline.
Id. at., 289 P.2d at 224. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08, (rent. Draft No. 8,1958).
The use of force upod or toward the person of another is justifiable if:
(1) the actor is the parent. . . and:
(a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare
of the minor. . and
(b) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial
risk of causing death, serious bodily harm, disfigurement, extreme pain or
mental distress or gross degradation; . . ..
Id.
73. Paulsen, The LegalFrameworkfor Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 695 (1966).
74. In re Carl, 174 Misc. 985, 987, 22 N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940), Accord,
Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,289 P.2d 218
(1955).
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dren. We have moved beyond the medieval concepts. Today the par-
ent-child relationship is a status and not a property right.7 5
It is distinctly unfair for the courts to refuse to protect children
from psychological abuse, and at the same time to protect husbands
and wives from such abuse. Divorce may be based upon grounds of
cruelty and general marital unkindness, grounds which often amount
to little more than psychological warfare.7 6 For example, nagging and
insulting language have been held to constitute cruelty justifying di-
vorce.7 7 Other cruelties named in divorce proceedings include the re-
fusal of a spouse to communicate verbally with the other,78 refusing
sexual relations for an unreasonable period, 9 insulting a spouse before
friends,"0 and falsely charging improper sexual conduct with others.81
In effect, the spouse is protected from a relationship in which little
kindness or consideration exists. But children receive no such legal
protection. This inconsistency hardly squares with egalitarian princi-
ples. As Henry Foster has said, "Children are people."8 2 For the
courts to recognize the importance of psychological well-being, and at
the same time to refuse to view such needs with respect to children, is to
deny their humanity. "A good deal of the difficulty in our treatment of
minors, legal and otherwise, stems from our refusal to accept them as
individuals, with their own needs, interests, and desires."8 3 When dis-
parity of treatment is unjustified, children have a moral right, and
should have a legal right, to the same safeguards as adults.
Based upon suits for alienation of parental affections, three juris-
dictions have recognized a child's right to emotional care and granted
recovery for its loss.8 4 In these cases, a parent has been enticed to leave
75. Anguis v. Superior Court, 6 Ariz. App. 68, 429 P.2d 702 (1967); Elliott v. Elliott, 235 N.C.
153, 69 S.E.2d 224 (1952); Commonwealth ex rel. Teitelbaum v. Teitelbaum, 160 Pa. Super. 286,
50 A.2d 713 (1947).
76. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONS 346-49 (1968).
77. Eg., Detjen v. Detjen, 40 Wash. 2d 479, 244 P.2d 238 (1952).
78. E.g., Hiecke v. Hiecke, 163 Wis. 171, 157 N.W. 747 (1916).
79. Eg., Reeves v. Reeves, 335 Mich. 193, 55 N.W.2d 793 (1952); Diemer v. Diemer, 8
N.Y.2d 206, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829, 168 N.E.2d 654 (1960) (dictum). See also Martin v. Martin, 141
Md. 182, 118 A. 410 (1922).
80. E.g., Hokamp v. Hokamp, 32 Wash. 2d 593, 203 P.2d 357 (1949).
81. Eg., Henry v. Henry, 21 Conn. Sup. 228, 152 A.2d 323 (Super. Ct. 1959); Hiltbrand v.
Hiltbrand, 68 Idaho 275, 193 P.2d 391 (1948); Miller v. Miller, 249 Iowa 725, 88 N.W.2d 816
(1958); Hartka v. Hartka, 346 Mich. 453, 78 N.W.2d 133 (1956).
82. Foster & Freed, supra note 42, at 318.
83. FOSTER, supra note 15, at 8.
84. Three jurisdictions have recognized this right independent of statutory authority. They
are: (1) Illinois: Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) (reaching its decision in the absence
of Illinois state court precedent); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); (2)
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the family setting by a third party. Children have been allowed to re-
cover from that third party for the loss of love and companionship
which they could reasonably have expected to receive. Such rulings
amount to a recognition that children have a legally protectable right to
the affection, companionship, and support of their parents. The grow-
ing child's future impact on society has been a major determinant in
the minds of those judges supporting such a right 
a
8
Foster and Freed report that the reluctance of the judicial branch
to sustain actions based on emotional deprivation is due in part to "a
common suspicion of psychiatric and psychological testimony, its in-
tangible quality, personal guilt, and the conclusive character of a termi-
nation of parental rights." 6 Undoubtedly this reasoning is equally
applicable to the legislatures' failure to concern themselves with the
mental health care of children.
Research into the ramifications of emotional deprivation is a rela-
tively new field of medical science. The law, which has traditionally
refused to recognize emotional abuse as a judicial concern, evolved at a
time when the dangers of emotional abuse were unknown. Many
judges have been unwilling to overturn longstanding precedent which
denies recovery for deprivation because of the lack of precedent or stat-
utory authority allowing such recovery." Unless the courts move to
break with these century-old rulings, children will not receive protec-
tion from what is known to be a serious threat to their health and gen-
eral well-being. Concepts which have outlived their usefulness, and
which fail to provide necessary protection against serious threats to
health, will continue to be perpetuated.
Judicial efforts to limit a parent's authority over his child should
Michigan: Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949); (3) Minnesota: Miller v. Mon-
sen, 288 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
85. Jenkens, supra note 31, 730-31.
86. Foster & Freed, supra note 42, at 323.
87. In Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978), actions were initiated by minor
children through their guardian against their parents. The children claimed emotional and psy-
chological injuries were intentionally caused by their parents in failing to provide care, comfort,
and companionship. In denying the action, the court stated, "Plaintiffs admit they can cite no
cases permitting them to recover from their parents for solely emotional or psychological damage
resulting from failure to support, nurture and care for them .... [Tihis is not a field of recovery
which has heretofore been recognized by courts. ... Id. at _..., 588 P.2d at 1108-09. See also
Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88
Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948), In the
Garza suit, four children brought an action against their father for the loss of his love and com-
panionship, and against his second wife for enticing their father to leave them. In denying recov-
ery, the court stated that it was for the legislature to establish such actions and for the court only to
enforce the law as it finds it. 209 S.W.2d at 1014.
[Vol. 15:299
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not be entered into lightly. A court should not, however, refuse to in-
tervene against psychological abuse on the, grounds that such actions
have not been taken in the past."8 Some jurisdictions have argued that
the legislature should define the bounds of any new child right before
the courts acknowledge such a right.8 9 Such reasoning is an effort to
shift the burden of responsibility. Courts are capable of establishing
the parameters of a right. They are sometimes required to engage in
this very activity, and are successful in such efforts.90
Undoubtedly, some judges experience difficulty in considering a
child abused or neglected when he appears to be in reasonably good
health and bears no marks of beatings or other violence. Any damage
which exists is difficult to discern by physical examination. The very
nature of psychological testimony is often vague and frequently is
viewed with suspicion. These factors, in conjunction with the possibil-
ity of a child's removal from the home upon a finding of neglect, make
judges extremely cautious toward such a finding. Unfortunately, it is
not always possible to foresee what may be the eventual result of emo-
tional abuse, when inflicted upon a child.
The courts have been slow in keeping pace with the transition
within the family that has occurred in this century.9 The judiciary has
88. See notes 100-103 infra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Huffington, 180 Kan. 340, 304 P.2d 465 (1956); Burnette v. Wahl,
284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948).
90. Eg., Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949). Michigan Cent. R.R. v.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1912) is an example of a court determining the boundaries of a right. An
action to recover for the wrongful death of the intestate, an employee of the railroad, was brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908. The Act gave a right of recovery "to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the
death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving
widow or husband and children of such employee." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976). The railroad argued
that as the employee survived his injury for several hours before dying, it was relieved from liabil-
ity. Counsel argued that a single right of recovery had been created. Either the injured party
could recover for his injury, or, in the case of instantaneous death, the action survived for the
benefit of the dependents. The Court rejected this narrow interpretation, stating that
[tihe obvious purpose of Congress was to save a right of action to certain relatives depen-
dent upon an employee wrongfully injured, for the loss and damage resulting to them
financially by reason of the wrongful death .... There is no express or implied limita-
tion of the liability to cases in which the death was instantaneous.
227 U.S. at 68.
91. Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Il. App. 588, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (1947).
It is common knowledge ... that a transition has taken place in our conception of
the family ....
The lag in the common law to keep pace with these transitions within the family
unit, particularly those affecting the interests of the children, was noted by Dean Pound
over a quarter of a century ago ....
Id. at ., 71 N.E.2d at 813.
15
Semler: A Child's Emotional Health--The Need for Legal Protection
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979
TULSA LAW JOUNAL
been reluctant to overrule ancient precedent, such as the supposed
unity of parent and child.92 Modem society has, however, ushered in
new demands that the rights of all individuals be protected through
equality under law.93 The courts must respond to this change and act
to promote the best interests of children, for children cannot act to pro-
mote their own interests.
Even without the benefit of legislative enactments authorizing ju-
dicial intervention on behalf of emotionally neglected or abused chil-
dren, there are several alternatives from which the courts may choose
to justify such protective measures. Since Daily v. Parker,94 those
courts which have granted a cause of action based on alienation of pa-
rental affections have done so based on the doctrine of judicial empiri-
cism.95 This theory holds that the common law is not bound by rigid,
unbending, and inflexible rules.96 Rather, it is a constantly expanding
process which is sufficiently elastic to adapt to the increasing needs of
society. Reason and natural justice are its foundations. Its rules arise
to meet changing societal conditions. Today it is reasonable for the
state to desire that its children mature into healthy, productive citizens,
and it is reasonable for the state to take measures to ensure that such
growth is possible. The common law should be expanded to protect the
emotional health of children. To concede that the common law is ca-
pable of expansion and change, and to simultaneously argue that the
courts have no authority to act in behalf of emotionally abused chil-
dren, either because the legislature has not mandated such authority, or
because the common law has previously adopted a stance contrary to
this position, is inconsistent. The courts are free to use the flexibility of
the common law as a valuable tool to safeguard the emotional welfare
of children. Based on present knowledge of the harm which may occur
by psychological abuse,97 such action would be both desirable and hu-
92. See notes 149-153 infra and accompanying text.
93. "[E]qual protection to all is the basic principle upon which justice under law rests."
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939). See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), wherein the
Supreme Court declared that the fourteenth amendment as well as the Bill of Rights applies to
juveniles as well as adults.
94. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
95. See note 90 supra.
96. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 166-92 (1921). The value of the common
law lies in its genius for creativity. "The judge fills the open spaces in the law. . . . Within the
confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and tradition choice moves with a freedom
which stamps its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found but made
.... " Justice Benjamin Cardozo as quoted in Johnson v. Luhman, 330 I11. App. 598, _, 71
N.E.2d 810, 814 (1947).
97. See notes 53-73 supra and accompanying text.
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mane.
As an alternative to the expansion of the common law, the courts
could, in some instances, interpret the harm caused by emotional abuse
as a bodily injury. This would allow the courts to end such abuse by
the authority of neglect statutes which universally guard against physi-
cal harm.98 An injury to the mind or nerves has frequently been con-
sidered a bodily injury,99 even though bodily impact was not present at
the time of the damage."° Bowlby states that emotional deprivation
may lead to "disorders of the nervous system." '' It is also well docu-
mented that emotionally abused children frequently become mentally
retarded.' 2 Therefore, whenever a child has become retarded because
of emotional abuse or has suffered injury to his nervous system caused
by emotional abuse, the courts could declare that the child has suffered
physical harm. The courts could then intervene by way of neglect leg-
islation. As one court has said, "The nerves are as much a part of the
physical system as the limbs."'0 3 The primary fault with this approach
is that it delays action until serious harm has already occurred. Still, it
is preferable to no action at all, and should be considered an alterna-
tive.
As a third basis for intervention, the courts could act by authority
of the doctrine ofparenspatriae."4 Through this doctrine, the state has
a broad range of power in matters involving the interests of children.
The ultimate policy basis supporting the parens patriae power is the
state's self-interest in perpetuating itself by providing responsible fu-
ture citizens. °5 It then follows that court intervention is legitimate
when necessary to grant children the opportunity to mature into well-
adjusted members of society. Such an approach is preventive in nature
and allows action whenever harm appears imminent, rather than wait-
ing until damage has become substantial.
"The elements which . . . constitute neglect of a child cannot be
limited to mere failure to provide properly for it insofar as its physical
98. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
99. Eg., Sloane v. Southern Cal. R., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896); Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906); Phillips v. Atlantic Coast Line R., 160 S.C. 323, 158 S.E. 274
(1931).
100. E.g., Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902); Johnson v. Sampson, 167
Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926); Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103
S.E.2d 265 (1958); Houston Elec. Co. v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 194 S.W.2d 546 (1946).
101. BOWLBY, supra note 46, at 14.
102. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
103. Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, _, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906) (dictum).
104. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
105. Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 P. 21 (1910).
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needs are concerned . *.... 10 Even critics such as Wald who argue
for a narrower approach to state intervention, recognize that action
may sometimes be necessary to halt emotional damage." 7 The law
should keep pace with the fact that children are individuals, and abu-
sive parents continue to subject these young individuals to severe suf-
fering. Such children remain without a defense. Perhaps the most
blatant example of this lies in the courts' unwillingness to grant a child
a cause of action against his parents for the intentional infliction of
emotional harm.
VII. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The law has only recently come to recognize that emotional inju-
ries may have as serious an impact as physical injuries to a person. 0 8
Tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional harm have tradition-
ally experienced difficulty in gaining acceptance. Nonrecognition was
said to be necessary because of the intangible nature of the injury'0 9
and the difficulty in measuring damages."10
Initially, a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress could
not be maintained unless accompanied by a previously recognized
tort."' Courts later concluded that proving emotional distress alone
may be more difficult than when accompanied by another tort. 2 The
landmark case of Wilkinson v. Downton I " was the first English decision
to allow recovery independent of an existing common law claim.
American courts followed this precedent and granted such an action
where the alleged mental injury was the result of extreme and outra-
geous conduct.' 14
An independent cause of action was strengthened by the 1948 revi-
sion of section 46 of the Restatement of Torts (Second). That revision
brought freedom from emotional distress into the zone of interests pro-
tected by law. Section 46 now states that "[o]ne who by extreme and
106. In re Carl, 174 Misc. 985, _., 22 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940).
107. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Weglected" Children: A Searchfor Realistic Stan-
dards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1016 (1975).
108. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 12, at 49 (4th ed. 1971).
109. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577 (1861). "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value,
and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone," Id. at
598.
110. Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900). See also PROSSER, supra note 108,
§ 12, at 50.
111. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 12, at 51.
112. Id. at 50.
113. 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress and
if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.""-,
Under this standard, recovery requires more than intentional or mali-
cious action. The action must be "outrageous in character, and so ex-
treme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized commu-
nity.,, 16 Further, the defendant need not have an actual desire to cause
emotional distress. The element of intent is satisfied if he knows with
substantial certainty that such harm will result from his act.' 
7
The authors of the Restatement have provided several guidelines
to assist in the determination of what constitutes "outrageous conduct."
First, insults, indignities, and annoyances do not, in and of themselves,
qualify as outrageous conduct." 8 The conduct may, however, be con-
sidered outrageous if the recipient of the action is known to suffer from
some particular sensitivity to the action involved. '" Dean Prosser also
suggests that outrageous conduct may result from abuse by the defend-
ant of some position or relationship he has with another. 20
Theoretically, children possess the same rights and protections as
adults.' 2 1 They are entitled to such as citizens. Actually, children are
denied these rights and protections because they are children. Adults
are protected in tort from the intentional infliction of emotional distress
115. Id.
116. Id. at Comment d.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). "The word intent is used throughout
the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or
that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." Id.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965). See PROSSER, supra note
114, § 12, at 54.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment f (1965).
120. PROSSER, supra note 114, § 12, at 56. Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971),
is one case where the relationship of the parties was a key factor in determining the outrageous-
ness of the act involved. There, a physician refused to render emergency medical assistance to an
unconscious infant. The court held that the doctor-patient relationship gave rise to an affirmative
duty on the part of the doctor to perform the necessary services. His failure to do so was deemed
extreme and outrageous conduct, and the court held him liable for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. As in the doctor-patient relationship, parents have special duties and obliga-
tions with respect to their children. Parental actions may be considered outrageous by virtue of
the relationship that exists between parent and child.
121. FONTANA, supra note 12, at 232. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), wherein the Court
declared that the fourteenth amendment as well as the Bill of Rights applies to juveniles as well as
adults. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding, intera/ia, that parental
consent could not be required before a minor could obtain an abortion). "Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. . . . The Court indeed,
however, long has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activi-
ties of children than of adults." Id. at 74.
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by others.' 22 Indeed, it is the widely held view that defendants should
be responsible whenever they intentionally cause severe emotional dis-
tress, or they intentionally or maliciously do a wrongful act which re-
sults in severe mental distress. 21 Yet, between parents and
unemancipated children, the courts have not recognized a cause of ac-
tion based upon these grounds. There has been no provision to allow
redress for damages. Consequently, children whose parents subject
them to emotional abuse are denied protection, even though other
members of society have a legal remedy for the same sort of abuse.
Safeguards are less stringent for children even though they are more
vulnerable to harm than are adults. Public policy demands that each
person be responsible for injuries he has inflicted upon others, 24 but
exceptions are made for parents who abuse their children.
The most common policy argument for not allowing a minor child
to sue his parents has been the preservation of family peace and tran-
quility. Beginning with Hewllette v. George,125 American courts first
declared that the abolition of parental immunity would disrupt the
family and destroy the very foundation of society. This reasoning led
to great injustice when, in Roller v. Roller,126 the Supreme Court of
Washington held that a fifteen-year-old girl who had been raped by her
father could not maintain suit, on the grounds that it would destroy the
beauty and serenity of the home. American courts borrowed the com-
122. See PROSSER, supra note 108, § 12, at 49-62.
123. "IT]he present rule allows recovery [for intentionally causing severe emotional distress]
even in the absence of a resulting physical harm." Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, ._ 272 P.2d 349,
351 (1954). "The rule seems to be well-established where the act is willful or malicious, as distin-
guished from being merely negligent, that recovery may be had for mental pain, though no physi-
cal injury results." Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, _.., 57 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 1953). One court
addressing this issue stated:
The interest in freedom from severe emotional distress is regarded as of sufficient impor-
tance to require others to refrain from conduct intended to invade it. Such conduct is
tortious. The injury suffered by the one whose interest is invaded is frequently far more
serious to him than certain tortious invasions of the interest in bodily integrity and other
legally protected interests. In the absence of a privilege, the actor's conduct has no social
utility; indeed it is antisocial. No reason or policy requires such an actor to be protected
from the liability which usually attaches to the wilful wrongdoer whose efforts are suc-
cessful.
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, _ 240 P.2d 282, 285 (Cal. 1952) (in
bank) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1948 Supp.)).
124. See, e.g., Schmidtman, Demise of Parent- Child Tort Immuniy, 12 WILLAMETTE LJ. 605
(1976).
125. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). Here, a mother had wrongfully and maliciously confined
her daughter to an insane asylum. Although citing no authority, the court denied recovery on the
grounds of public policy. This case laid the foundation for the general rule of parental immunity
from torts to their children. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 122, at 865.
126. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
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mon law doctrine of unity between husband and wife1 27 to justify the
argument of family peace and tranquility and the parental immunity
rule. For several reasons, the theory of interspousal immunity can no
longer be legitimately applied to uphold parental immunity.
At common law, the marriage of a man and a woman resulted in a
single legal entity.12  All personal and property rights of the woman
were joined with her husband, 29 and she had no separate legal exist-
ence. Consequently, the wife could not sue her husband because the
husband would be both plaintiff and defendant. 30 The Married Wo-
men's Acts in the nineteenth century abolished the concept of one en-
tity between husband and wife.' 3 ' The wife became entitled to own
and control separate property, 32 to sue her husband for injury to that
separate property, 33 and to bring an action for wrongful injury inde-
pendently of her husband. 34 Thus, the theory of one legal entity be-
tween husband and wife is obsolete, and no longer provides a solid
basis for preservation of parental immunity. Still, the majority rule has
been that unemancipated minors may not maintain tort actions against
their parents. There have been two basic reasons for this policy. First,
it has been deemed desirable to promote the cohesiveness of the family
under parental discipline and authority. 3 ' The law has sought to pre-
vent upheaval which might undermine this authority. 136 Second, the
law presumes that parents care for and promote the best interests of
their children. Hence, parents have retained immunity from the fail-
ures which inevitably occur.
137
127. Id See PROSSER, supra note 108, § 122, at 859; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Do-
mestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1069 (1930).
128. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 122, at 864.
129. Id. at 859.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 861.
132. McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses, 2 VILL. L. REv. 447 (1957).
133. Id.
134. E.g., Long v. McWilliams, 11 Okla. 562, 69 P. 882 (1902).
135. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 122, at 866.
136. "Preservation of the parent's right to discipline his minor children has been the basic
policy behind the rule of parental immunity from tort liability." Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,
289 P.2d 218 (1955) (unemancipated minor may sue parent for wilful or malicious tort).
137. Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d 449, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957). In Hender-
son the court recognized that certain acts would remove this immunity:
By wantonly subjecting his child to probable and certain injury, he forfeits all claim to
immunity. Such wanton acts remove from his person the cloak of immunity granted to
him upon the assumption that he would care for the needs and the welfare of his child.
A suit upon behalf of the infant cannot properly be deemed the disrupting cause of the
family's disunity when the parent by his misdeeds has already caused the tranquility of
the family unit to be disturbed and shattered.
Id. at _, N.Y.S.2d at 114.
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That parental discipline should be maintained is not seriously de-
bated. 3 ' Parental discipline, however, should be subject to reasonable
boundaries. In those few jurisdictions which have abrogated the im-
munity rule, two basic tests have been developed by which to ascertain
whether disciplinary action is tortious. In Wisconsin, the rule estab-
lished in Goller v. White 139 is that parental immunity is abolished ex-
cept where the parent is exercising his authority, and where the alleged
wrongdoing involves discretion as to the provision of basic necessities
such as food and shelter.' 40 Under this test, the parent is immune from
liability so long as he is exercising his authority as a parent, regardless
of how negligently he exercises that authority. Under the California
test, established in Gibson v. Gibson,14 1 parental liability turns upon
what "an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent [would] have done
in similar circumstances."1 42 Under this test, parents are liable for neg-
ligent acts even though the act involves parental authority.
In McKelvey v. McKelvey, 43 the Supreme Court of Tennessee de-
clared that the common law would not allow a minor to sue his parents
and that this was analogous to the interspousal immunity rule. Unfor-
tunately, the court's decision was based on a misinterpretation of the
English common law. The English common law did not view the par-
ent and child as one legal entity.'" The child could own property inde-
pendently, and could maintain suit to protect his property and
contractual interests. 145 The child could initiate a tort action and was
responsible for his own torts. 14 6 Therefore, the McKelvey court's at-
tempt to analogize the unity of husband and wife to the unity of parent
and child was based upon a misunderstanding of the common law.
This misinterpretation was relied upon by many subsequent courts in
establishing the parental immunity rule. 141
If domestic tranquility justifies immunity for parental wrongs to
138. See notes 78-82, supra.
139. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
140. Id.
141. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (in bank) (overruling Trudell v.
Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931) and rejecting the implication of Goller v. White, 20 Wis.
2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), that within certain aspects of the parent-child relationship the
parent is free to act negligently toward his child).
142. 3 Cal. 3d at , 479 P.2d at 653.
143. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
144. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 122, at 864; McCurdy, supra note 132, at 1057.
145. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 122, at 864.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Mesite v. Kirschstein,
109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash, 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
[Vol. 15:299
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children, it is difficult to understand why unemancipated children may
maintain suit against their parents for injury to property or in contract.
Domestic harmony may be upset by a property action as greatly as by a
personal tort action. "It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper
for an unemancipated child to bring an action against his parent con-
cerning the child's property rights yet to be utterly without redress with
reference to injury to his person."'
' 48
The general rule of no immunity with regard to contract and prop-
erty actions has been strengthened by the application of the general
rule to some tort actions. There has been a definite trend toward limit-
ing immunity, especially where such action will not upset family life or
where family unity already has been destroyed. Children have gained
the right to sue the estate of a deceased parent 49 and to recover for
torts which were related to the parent's business. 5 ' In addition, per-
sonal tort actions have been allowed where the child is emancipated," l
and where the child is adopted. 52 "[T]he tendency has been to whittle
away the rule by statute and by the process of interpretation, distinc-
tion, and exception, until what we have left today is a conglomerate of
paradoxical and irreconcilable judicial decisions." '
Yet emotional distress actions against parents have consistently
been denied. If children are to be denied a remedy based upon a policy
of family tranquility, that doctrine should apply equally to bar suits for
other parental wrongs. That has not been the case. Arguments against
suits for emotional distress based on family unity are unpersuasive be-
cause intrafamily actions are already widely accepted. In addition, by
the time court action is sought, family unity has generally substantially
deteriorated. There may be little unity to preserve.
By abolishing parental immunity for intentional torts 154 and for
negligence suits, 55 the courts have allowed a child to sue his parent. It
is doubtful that the peace of the home would be greater hostage to a
suit for intentional emotional abuse than to a suit for intentional physi-
cal abuse. It may be that to allow an action would actually serve to
mend the family. In the words of the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
148. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, _, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
149. Eg., Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
150. E.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) (en bane).
151. Eg., Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961).
152. E.g., Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939).
153. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, _ 282 A.2d 351, 354 (1971).
154. Eg., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (in bank).
155. Eg., Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
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"Where a wrong has been committed of a character sufficiently aggra-
vated to justify recovery were the parties strangers, the harm has been
done. We believe the prospect of reconciliation is enhanced as much
by equitable reparation as by denying relief altogether .... ,l56
To allow intrafamily actions for intentional torts and at the same
time to deny such actions for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is inconsistent. The evidence concerning emotional abuse is clear.
Children suffer as greatly through emotional maltreatment as through
physical maltreatment. It is unjust that the courts more zealously safe-
guard the child's property and contractual rights than the rights of his
person. It is logical for the courts to expand protection to defend the
emotional health of children from intentional destruction.
Another argument advanced in opposition to parental suits for
emotional distress is that such an action would inundate the courts. 157
If that should prove to be the case, it may show the extent to which
such abuse occurs. It may also emphasize the need for a remedy.' 58
Courts should deal with a case on its merits, regardless of the number
of similar claims. Another reason courts have used for denying such
actions is the lack of precedent, 59 but to deny standing to sue simply
because "thus saith tradition," is, in the words of Justice Holmes, "re-
volting.' 1 60 That a child's right has previously been unrecognized, and
that heretofore there has evolved no binding precedent for recovery, is
no justification for refusal to uphold a common law remedy where his
rights have been wrongfully violated by another.' 6' The law is capable
of expansion, and a cause of action need not even have a recognized
name.' 62 New torts are constantly being recognized.' 63  "[A]ny rule
156. Baits v. BaIts, 273 Minn. 419,_...., 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966) (removing the immunity as a
defense in tort actions by a parent against a child but reserving the question as to immunity in
actions by child against parent).
157. E.g., Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
158. Jenkens, supra note 31, at 743.
159. E.g., Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
160. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
161. See Dailey v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281
(W.D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
162. Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L. R-v. 91 (1921).
163. As Dean Prosser has noted:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the com-
mon law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out
boldly to create a new cause of action, where none had been recognized before. . . .The
law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are never set. When
it becomes clear that the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the
[Vol. 15:299
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which demands the sacrifice of justice in order that it may hold sway as
a universal rule is unworthy of a place in our law."'' " The courts pos-
sess the authority to recognize an action against a parent for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress without the benefit of precedent.
"The doctrine of parental immunity, as far as it goes, was created by
the courts. It is especially for them to interpret and modify that doc-
trine to correspond with prevalent considerations of public policy and
social needs." '65 The obstacles to the creation of a legal remedy were
constructed by the court and may be removed by the same means.
"[I]njury is the primary and paramount consideration, not the charac-
ter of the defendant who inflicts it, nor the nature of the act itself. If
causation and injury can be established, and the defendant acted
wrongfully, the law will give a remedy."'
166
If the extent of parental immunity is to correspond to public policy
and social needs, then it should be abolished with regard to intentional
emotional abuse.' 67 It is well established that some children suffer
from extensive emotional abuse intentionally inflicted by their parents
and that such emotional anguish spawns serious side effects and some-
times permanent injury. Children are provided no escape from such
circumstances unless there is accompanying physical abuse that can be
visibly detected. A right of action to provide minimal safeguards is
urgently needed.
Although public policy does seek to promote the peace and unity
of the family, it also declares its allegiance to the best interests of the
child. The courts should not endeavor to maintain unity at the expense
of children's welfare. To do so is to cultivate only an illusion of family
conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as
a bar to the remedy.
PROSSER, supra note 108, § 1, at 3-4.
164. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, _., 218 P.2d 445, 454 (1950) (Rossman, J., concurring).
165. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, _ 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956).
166. Comment, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF. L. REv. 461, 463
(1922).
167. While parental immunity should be abolished for intentional mental distress, such immu-
nity should remain intact for the negligent infliction of mental distress. The preservation of family
peace and harmony, and of the parental right to discipline is a legitimate societal goal. When
parental acts have resulted in severe mental distress to the child, but such acts were not com-
menced with a desire to cause such harm, and the reasonable parent would not have believed that
such harm would result, then the policy of parental immunity should prevail. In this instance, the
parent is likely to be concerned with his child's welfare and willing to protect the child's interests.
But where the parent has acted with a desire to cause severe distress, or had reason to believe that
his act would result in such distress, and yet acted in reckless disregard of the consequences,
parental immunity should be abolished. In this instance, the parent has exhibited an attitude
which would indicate that he does not desire family unity, nor is he concerned with protecting the
best interests of his child.
25
Semler: A Child's Emotional Health--The Need for Legal Protection
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
tranquility. In reality there is little cohesion in a family relationship
where intentional suffering is dealt to one member by another member.
Society disdains the infliction of unnecessary pain and anguish. There
is no logical reason to regard children as exceptions to that principle.
Tort law is designed "for the creation and protection of rights.' 6 8
"A child has a moral right and should have a legal right. . . [t]o re-
ceive parental love and affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow
to maturity in a home environment which enables him to develop into
a mature and responsible adult . . ,. . If courts are not willing to
insist on these affirmative parental duties, they should at least take
measures against intentional mistreatment which is detrimental to the
child.
Precedent which is no longer relevant should be discarded. Every
person who is injured or is harmed in his property or reputation, by the
wrongful act of another, should find a remedy.'7 0 One of the primary
reasons for the limitation of absolute parental immunity has been to
grant such remedies. Consistency requires that the courts extend liabil-
ity so that children have redress for undeserved mental anxiety inten-
tionally caused by their parents.
The modem rule is to allow children a tort action against parents
if the tort was intentional or resulted from willful misconduct.' 7' Such
behavior is in no way related to the responsibilities of parenthood. Pa-
rental discipline cannot reasonably be said to be inhibited by the exten-
sion of such acts. Immunity does not exist by reason of absolute right
of the parent to do with his child as he pleases. Rather, it is a means to
enable the parent to fulfill those family responsibilities which society
demands, as well as a recognition that shortcomings are inevitable. Im-
munity is justified upon the premise that authority will be used to bene-
fit the child. When this premise has been destroyed through
168. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, _. 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966).
169. FOSTER, supra note 115, at 25.
170. See, e.g., Johnson v. Luhmnan, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); MASS. CONST. Pt.
I, art. XI; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10.
171. E.g., Hebel v. Hebel, - Alaska ., 435 P.2d 8 (1966); Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129
S.W.2d 245 (1939); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971);
Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Haw. 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199,
241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn.
419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W . 1 (1932); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930);
France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
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mistreatment and abuse, the basis for justification no longer exists. At
that point immunity should be abolished.
Parents should not be held responsible for unintentional torts
which may occasionally occur within the home, but should be liable for
acts of willful misconduct. Intentional parental wrong should remove
the shield of immunity as the assumption that a parent is acting to pro-
tect his child is no longer valid. Immunity was never meant to serve as
a cloak for intended wrongs.1 72 It should not apply when a parent acts
outside the parent-child relationship. If the relationship is incidental
and the child would have been able to maintain the action had that
relationship not existed, the action should be maintained in spite of the
relationship. 
73
Child neglect is costly to all of society. Abused children are more
apt to gravitate to a life of crime, and are violence prone. 74 All citizens
pay the costs of crime. Increased crime requires that greater resources
be devoted to police and other law enforcement agencies. "Any econ-
omy achieved by the failure to provide for the needs of the neglected
child is doubly dissipated by the cost of dealing with increases in adult
crimes, physical and mental breakdowns, and socially dysfunctional
adults." 175 Consequently, it would be in the best interests of society for
the law to destroy those elements which are conducive to crime. This
requires, however, that lawmakers concern themselves with the emo-
tional as well as the physical health of children. The cycle of child
abuse will not be eliminated until the emotional climate of the home is
made an object of the law's concern.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The present century has seen increased awareness of both the
needs and inherent rights of children. In a resolution supported by the
United States, the United Nations General Assembly declared:
The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given
opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to en-
able him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually
and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in condi-
tions of freedom and dignity.'
76
172. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
173. See Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927) (Crownhart, J., dissenting).
174. FONTANA, supra note 12, 110-15.
175. A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE STRATEGY IN THE COMING YEARs: AN OVERVIEW 20
(1978).
176. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 19 (1960).
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Despite professions of good intentions, the move toward equality has
been too gradual.
Whether a child receives love and companionship from his parents
will have an impact on society. It will affect his ability to function
properly within socially acceptable bounds, as well as influence his im-
mediate and prospective physical and emotional well-being. Emotion-
ally deprived children suffer from a loss of identity and often become
involved in violent crimes.
Lawmakers have recognized the need to protect children from
physical mistreatment and have taken steps to try to prevent it. They
have not, however, become fully aware of the need to insulate children
from psychological abuse. While the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard theoretically guides public policy, little concern has been shown
toward safeguarding psychological development. In a society which is
based on rule of law, the humanity of children may be protected only if
they are granted full legal rights. Our social and legal values must be
re-examined. Parental rights should not be so absolute as to preempt a
child's right to emotional stability. Many children will continue to be
abused if the courts persist in upholding precedent and traditions
which yield to parental rights at the expense of the child. Lawmakers
cannot guarantee that all children will receive the love and affection
essential to well-rounded development, but the law can intervene when
physical or psychological abuse is discovered. Children should not be
sacrificed in order to preserve traditional parental rights once the fam-
ily unit has been destroyed.
Every child should have a legal guarantee of a reasonable oppor-
tunity for emotional as well as physical development. Children are a
precious resource who should be-and who deserve to be-protected at
law. The Judeo-Christian belief in the dignity of man has no age limit.
It is in the interest of the community as well as the child that abuse of
all kinds be condemned. Greatly needed assistance will be unnecessa-
rily delayed if the law continues to view neglect solely in physical
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